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Abstract 
The main goal of this paper is to empirically test the function of European merger control 
in light of the 2004 regulatory reform, which was expected to introduce a more efficient 
regulatory framework for the assessment of mergers within the EU. We use stock market 
data to identify cases where there are discrepancies between the European Commission’s 
decisions compared to market evaluations of the mergers in question. Using the PROBIT 
model, these cases are further investigated to discover the sources of these discrepancies.  
In line with previous studies, our results suggest that the discrepancies are caused by 
procedural and institutional factors. Nevertheless, the regulatory reform introduced   
in 2004 has, to some extent, enhanced the efficiency of European merger control in 
the sense that the Commission’s assessments of mergers under the new regulation are 
more consistent with the market evaluations. We found that the probability of an anti- 
-competitive deal being cleared decreases significantly under the new regulatory frame-
work. Nevertheless, the occurrence of unnecessary remedies has not decreased as the re-
sult of the new merger control system. 
To the authors’ best knowledge, this paper is the first study using stock market data to 
evaluate the recent reform of European merger control.  
1. Introduction 
European merger control dates back to the Treaty of Rome of 1957, which 
created the  European Economic Community and its main institutions. Although 
merger control was not explicitly mentioned in the  Treaty, the  competition rules   
set out in Article 81 (formerly Article 85) and Article 82 (formerly Article 86) of 
the Treaty prohibited the abuse of a dominant position and to some extent also dealt 
with anti-competitive agreements which may have an  appreciable effect on trade 
between Member States and which prevent, restrict or distort competition in the Sin-
gle Market. 
While initially both Articles 81 and 82 might have been applied to mergers 
only in a limited way, they still allowed some degree of influence by the European 
Commission over potentially very unattractive mergers (see Lyons, 2008). The Com-
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mission did not obtain real merger control authority until 1989, when the  main 
legislative text for merger regulation – the European Community Merger Regulation 
(ECMR) – appeared. This was viewed as one of many measures necessary to facili-
tate the development of a single European market (Vickers, 2004). 
The ECMR gave the Commission vast power to enforce competition policy in 
the EU. All planned mergers of large companies that have significant business ac-
tivities in the Member States have to be submitted for approval by the Commission.
1 
The  Commission then evaluates the  proposed combination in a  short proceeding 
known as a Phase I investigation. If the Commission finds the proposed merger to  
be generally compatible with the rules of the Common Market, it either approves 
the merger (Article 6.1. of the ECMR), or approves it with some conditions and obli-
gations (Article 6.1.b). Otherwise, the Commission starts a more detailed Phase II 
investigation that can again result in the merger being approved (Article 8.1.), being 
approved with remedies (Article 8.2.) or being blocked (Article 8.3.). If the Commis-
sion finds the merger unacceptable and prohibits it, the decision is final unless it is 
revoked by the Court of First Instance (CFI). The decision of the CFI may come two 
or three years after the Commission decision and, given the delay, is likely to be 
irrelevant for the companies originally interested in merging.
2 Therefore, the Com-
mission has an enormously strong bargaining position for enforcing various commit-
ments by the merging companies (in comparison with its US and UK counterparts).
3  
In addition, the importance of the Commission is increasing with regard to 
the number of merger proposals it now evaluates. During the early years of merger 
control, the Commission yearly evaluated only a few merger cases, while in 2007 
the number of cases evaluated exceeded 400 (see Table 1). 
With the increasing number of cases evaluated, the confidence of the Commis-
sion in the adequacy of its decisions has risen too. The number of merger cases charged 
with some form of remedy rose significantly and the number of prohibited mergers 
reached its maximum in 2001, when five mergers were blocked. A major shock came, 
however, in 2002, when the CFI reversed three of those controversial decisions, raising 
serious concerns about the inadequate economic analysis and procedural weaknesses of 
the Commission’s evaluation methods (Lyons, 2008).
4  
1 According to Article 1(2) of the ECMR, a concentration is deemed to have a Community dimension 
when (i) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned exceeds EUR 5 bil-
lion; and (ii) the Community-wide turnover of each of at least two undertakings concerned exceeds EUR 
250 million, unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate 
Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State. For credit and financial institutions
the turnover thresholds are replaced by consideration of financial income sources (i.e., interest income,
income from securities) while for insurance companies turnover is replaced by gross premium written; see 
Turnover Calculation Notice, paragraphs 56–57. 
2 For example, the Airtours/First Choice case took almost three years from Commission decision to CFI
final judgment. In another highly controversial case – GE/Honeywell – the CFI judgment came almost five 
years after the merger notification. 
3 For a detailed comparison of different regulatory practices see, for instance, Röller et al. (2000). 
4 According to CFI judgments, the Commission did not conduct a sufficiently rigorous economic analysis 
of the incentives for and ability to coordinate behavior in Airtours/First Choice, and it failed to take ac-
count of the different degree of competition in each of the national markets in the Schneider/Legrand case. 
In Tetra Laval/Sidel, the Commission’s concerns over leveraging market power between two otherwise
separate markets could not be legally justified. In addition, the CFI criticized the Commission for a low 
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The Court opined that regulations were needed to introduce a “more economic 
approach” into the Commission’s appraisal procedures, a concept already recognized 
in a Green Paper (2001).
5 The reform process culminated in 2004, when a new ECMR, 
together with guidelines for the assessment of horizontal mergers, was introduced.  
In terms of the  procedural and institutional changes, the  new framework 
preserves the so-called “one-stop shop”
6  rule, but it also makes it easier for national 
authorities to take part in the decision-making process in merger cases that signifi-
cantly affect competition within their member states. It also gives the Commission 
more time to cope with the increasing workload: new pre-notification rules have been 
put in place and both the Phase I and Phase II investigation durations have been 
extended moderately and made more flexible.
7 The new office of Chief Economist 
created within the Competition Directorate General, together with the newly estab-
lished European Advisory Group on Competition Policy (EAGCP), should provide 
a more economic approach to the Commission’s analysis.  
The core of the reformed ECMR is a new prohibition criterion (SIEC)
8, which re-
places the old dominance test and gives the Commission more “maneuvering space”  
for merger appraisals.
9 The newly published Horizontal Merger Guidelines (HMR)
10 
should provide guidance on how the Commission assesses horizontal mergers and  
is in line with the modern economic theory of industrial organization. Among other 
things, the HMR explicitly differentiates between coordinated and non-coordinated 
effects, thus closing the existing enforcement gap in cases of oligopoly markets where 
mergers would have anti-competitive effects without creating or fostering domi-
nance. On the other hand, the  Guidelines also explicitly list the potential counter-
vailing factors that can result in merger approval despite the market dominance of 
merging parties, thus giving merger parties more scope for defense against potential 
rejections from the Commission.
11   
The key goal of the new legislation was to provide a more transparent, effi-
cient and “consumer oriented” approach in line with the competition criteria appli- 
ed in the US and UK. The aim of this paper is to empirically test the quality of EU 
merger control in the last two decades and to provide an insight into the effects of 
the 2004 reform on the overall efficiency of the new merger regulation. We use stock 
5 See the Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, COM (2001) 745/6 final,
11/12/2001. 
6 Under the “one-stop shop” rule, national authorities cannot carry out a competition review where the Com-
mission has jurisdiction, and a decision by the Commission covers the whole EU. 
7 Phase I has been prolonged to a maximum of 25 + 35 = 60 working days (formerly 10 weeks), while
Phase II can currently take up to 90 + 20 + 15 = 125 working days (formerly four months). 
8 SIEC stands for Significant Impedance of Effective Competition and is defined in Article 2 (3) of
the ECMR as “A concentration which would significantly impede effective competition, in the common 
market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant 
position, shall be declared incompatible with the common market.” 
9 While in the old test dominance could be considered a necessary condition for merger prohibition, 
the  dominance criterion in the  new test is incorporated only as an  example of how concentration can 
impede effective competition. 
10 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of con-
centrations between undertakings (2004/C 31/03). 
11 For more details on the desirability of an efficiency defense in merger control, see Lagerlöf and
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market data to identify merger cases that the  market expected to hurt (anti-com-
petitive) or benefit (pro-competitive) consumers. We then compare this information 
with the real decisions made by the Commission and identify discrepancies between 
the  assessment of the  market and that of the  regulator, i.e., instances in which 
the Commission blocked pro-competitive mergers or approved anti-competitive merg-
ers. Consequently, we run a simple regression model to find the main factors driving 
the occurrence of these discrepancies and we test for significance in the effects of 
the recent regulatory reform on the data. 
2. Literature Overview 
The event study approach, using the movements of stock prices to assess the ef-
fect of a particular event on a firm’s value, was first applied by Dolley (1933), then 
further developed mainly by Ball and Brown (1968) and later by Fama et al. (1969). 
A significant share of the event study research has focused on the ability of mergers 
to create value for shareholders of merging parties; see Andrade et al. (2001) for an ex-
tensive overview of M&A research.  
Considerably less attention has been given to applications of this methodology 
for competition policy purposes. Such an analysis first appeared in Eckbo (1983), 
who evaluated 259 US mergers, of which 79 were challenged by the antitrust author-
ities. Eckbo examines movements in the share prices of competitors to see whether 
they supported the anti-competitive nature of the mergers and found they did not. 
According to his results, challenged mergers had been based on synergistic effects 
rather than increases of market power and potential collusive behavior. Stillman 
(1983) conducts a smaller study with a similar aim where the results were consistent 
with those of Eckbo. Both studies find a lack of significant statistical evidence from 
stock price movements to support referral to the antitrust authorities on competition 
grounds. 
The first study using the event study method to examine EU merger control, 
conducted by Brady and Feinberg (2000), analyzes the effect of particular news on 
EU merger procedures, for instance regarding decisions to open Phase II investiga-
tions. They focused on stock market reactions to news of the merging parties and 
found that enforcement of the merger regulation has a substantial effect on individual 
company stock values.  
Neven and Röller (2002) analyze 100 EU merger cases from the first ten years 
of EU merger control in order to explore the  main factors that may account for 
discrepancies between the  Commission’s decisions and the  reactions of the  stock 
market. Using a simple correlation analysis, they found that discrepancies could be 
associated with the political economy of merger control, that discrepancies are more 
frequent in Phase I investigations and when large countries are involved, and that 
competitors may play an important role in favor of anti-competitive deals.  
Bergman et al. (2003) use the insights of Coate and McChesney (1992) in analyz-
ing EU merger cases and trying to account for decisions to open a Phase II investi-
gation and decisions to prohibit a  merger in terms of the  factors listed in the  final 
documentation. They test whether the Commission gives appropriate weight to factors 
regarded as important ex ante (for instance published in merger guidelines) and to 
factors regarded as important by economic theory (market shares, barriers to entry, etc.). Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 3                                     257 
Duso et al. (2005) analyze the stock market’s ability to identify potential anti-
competitive effects and remedial provisions on transactions assessed by the Commis-
sion. They find that the market seems able to predict the effectiveness of the remedies 
applied in Phase I and to produce good estimates prior to Phase II clearances and 
prohibitions, but not remedies.  
Duso et al. (2007) follow Eckbo (1983) and Stillman (1983) in order to identify 
“errors” in the Commission’s merger decisions in the period 1990–2002. They rely 
on the theoretical framework from Farell and Shapiro (1990), using a unique corre-
spondence between changes in profits of competitors and consumer welfare to iden-
tify anti-competitive mergers. They further apply the theoretical framework from 
Neven and Röller (2005), according to which an antitrust agency maximizes its own 
utility and third parties (firms, governments, etc.) can affect its utility, and they build 
a regression model to analyze the determinants of the Commission’s decision making. 
Their results suggest that the Commission’s decisions cannot be solely accounted for 
by the motive of protecting consumer welfare. Instead, they suggest that other factors 
– such as country and industry effects, as well as market definition and procedural 
aspects – affect the decision making of the EU antitrust agency.  
Last but not least, Aktas et al. (2007) use an event study approach to evaluate 
the hypothesis that the EU merger regulation is protectionist. They analyze whether 
the market considers the prospect for regulatory intervention in its initial assessment 
of proposed mergers and test whether the Commission is biased against mergers in-
volving non-EU firms. They conclude that for mergers initiated by foreign bidders, 
the probability of regulatory intervention was increasing with the magnitude of (nega-
tive) stock returns of European competitors around the merger announcement date. 
Clearly from this review, merger control in the European Union is becoming 
an increasingly popular topic of empirical research, mainly due to the availability of 
relevant data. Nevertheless, none of the current studies assesses the most recent EU 
merger cases in light of the effects of the 2004 regulatory reform. In addition, most of 
the studies focus on a particular empirical question, while we apply a more holistic 
approach that provides an insight into the overall efficiency of EU merger control, as 
described further below. 
3. Methodology  
In our research, we follow the approach used by Duso et al. (2007), but we ap-
ply a slightly different (and in our view more appropriate) methodology for calculat-
ing abnormal returns and for the subsequent calculation of competitors’ gains from 
the merger. In addition, we use a different method for estimating the marginal effects 
of dependent variables in our model, a method that is better suited to PROBIT mod-
els with dummy right-side variables. The main contribution of this paper is that we 
constructed a unique sample of 161 horizontal mergers evaluated by the Commission 
between 1990 and 2008. Our sample offers an opportunity to gain the first insight into 
the effects of the recent EU regulatory reform on proposed mergers. Note that none 
of the previous studies worked with merger cases evaluated after 2002.  
Our methodology can be divided into four main steps. In the first step, we 
provide some rationale behind the evaluation of a merger’s competitive effects using 
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sentative sample of horizontal mergers using publicly available information from 
the Commission’s website and collect information about mergers and relevant com-
petitors in our sample. In the third step, we use stock market data to calculate the ab-
normal change in the market value of competitors around the merger announcement 
date. This information is then used to identify the market’s assessment of the compet-
itive effects of the mergers in our sample and to recognize cases where there are dis-
crepancies between the market’s and the Commission’s evaluation of the merger, i.e., 
cases where the Commission had prohibited mergers that the stock market regarded 
as pro-competitive as well as instances where the Commission had failed to prevent 
anti-competitive mergers. In the last step, we specify our econometric model using 
findings from the previous studies and we apply PROBIT regression to investigate 
the sources of the discrepancies between the market’s and the Commission’s evalua-
tion of mergers, with a particular focus on the effects of the 2004 reform on the oc-
currence of these discrepancies. 
3.1 Step 1: Merger Assessment Using the Event Study Approach 
In order to evaluate the merger decisions of the Commission, we need to com-
pare these to some independent criterion. In contrast to US antitrust procedures, where 
independent evaluations are undertaken by both the Federal Trade Commission and 
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, the EU merger regulation does 
not offer any alternative institutional assessment and the Commission is solely re-
sponsible for the whole appraisal process. Instead, we use the stock market view on 
the  expected effects of the  merger on competitors to evaluate the  merger’s com-
petitive effects.  
In particular, we look at the  effects of the  merger announcement on share 
prices of competitors to assess the aggregate welfare changes resulting from the merg- 
er. This method relies on the theoretical framework developed by Farell and Shapiro 
(1990) showing that under some general assumptions there is a clear correspondence 
between the effects of horizontal mergers on consumers and competitors, i.e., if a merg-
er results in increased profits of competitors, it will harm consumers and vice versa.  
The main advantage of this approach is that we have an independent assess-
ment of the  merger’s competitive effects which we can compare with the  Com-
mission’s decisions. Moreover, we observe stock market reactions on the  day of 
the announcement irrespective of whether the merger is approved by the Commission 
in the end. We thus avoid the censoring problem, as we can include in our sample 
cases where the merger was blocked by the Commission.
12  
The main disadvantage of this approach is that we need to rely on the ability 
of the stock market reaction to provide a timely and unbiased estimate of the firm’s 
change in profit, even though that estimate may not be very precise. This assumption 
is closely connected to the  semi-strong version of the  efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH) (Brealey and Mayers, 1995). The empirical evidence of the EMH has a long 
12 However, censoring is not fully eliminated, as we naturally need to exclude from our sample all cases
where relevant competitors, or their parent companies, are not publicly listed. Another censoring problem
may arise due to sample selectivity of EU merger data. Note that we cannot collect relevant information 
for withdrawn cases, cases with no documentation, and the cases that were resolved in the “simplified pro-
cedure” under the new ECMR. We thus recognize potential censoring problems in our analysis, but it 
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history and there are literally hundreds of finance papers confirming the general con-
clusion that developed stock markets are semi-strong efficient, although the general 
belief in the efficiency of stock markets has been seriously undermined by the recent 
financial crisis. In addition, there is a question about the ability of studies using stock 
market reactions of competitors to distinguish between the expected anti-competitive 
effects of a merger and the other information revealed by the stock reaction, such as 
changes in the likelihood of future market configuration.
13  
3.2 Step 2: Selection of Merger Cases and Identification of Relevant 
Competitors 
First, we have to select a sample of suitable merger cases for our analysis. We 
use publicly available information from the Commission’s website.
14 Given the large 
number of cases evaluated by the Commission (a total of 4,164 by the end of 2008) 
and the time intensity of the data collection process, we applied the following selec-
tive approach. We start with all 154 Phase II cases from the beginning of 1990 until 
October 2008. We have to exclude some of the most recent cases because of unavail-
ability of Commission reports. We also exclude all the cases that the Commission 
considered to be of a purely vertical or conglomerate nature.  
We then start with the  identification of relevant competitors. One option, 
widely used in older studies focusing mainly on antitrust proceedings in the US, is to 
identify competitors according to their industry classification codes (i.e., SIC, NACE) 
and include all firms that belong to the same industry as merging parties.
15 Such 
a  method assures a  sufficient number of observations, but it increases the  risk of 
including firms irrelevant to the competitive effects of the merger, as industry clas-
sification codes provide only a rough estimate of the real competitive setup of a par-
ticular market. Some firms with the same classification code might be customers or 
suppliers of the  merging parties. Therefore, empirical results from such a  sample 
might be significantly biased.
16  
In order to avoid the shortcomings of this approach, we follow the method 
applied in more recent studies that deal with the EU merger regulation and we work 
only with the competitors identified by the Commission’s economic team. The big-
gest advantage of this approach is that the Commission’s experts have made a careful 
market definition – every merger case report includes a clear definition of relevant 
product and geographical markets as well as a list of competitors present in those 
markets. The main disadvantage is obviously that we rely on the information pro-
vided by the Commission to evaluate its own decision making, and our results might 
be biased as a  consequence of this endogenous inconsistency. If the  Commission 
selectively picks relevant competitors to support its final decision, our results are 
likely to underestimate the occurrence of discrepancies between the Commission’s 
13 The main advantages and disadvantages of the event study method in the assessment of the competitive 
effects of mergers are also discussed in Duso et al. (2007).  
14 Available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases. 
15 See Aktas et al. (2007) for an overview of relevant studies. 
16 As pointed out by Clougherty and Duso (2008), if we treated customer-firms as competitors, the abnor-
mal returns would be biased upwards – synergies generated by merger will lead to lower prices for cus-
tomer firms. Including firms with no relation to the merging parties in our sample would generate bias of
competitors’ abnormal returns toward zero, because such firms would be unaffected by the merger. 260                                           Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 3 
evaluation and the market evaluation based solely on movements of the share prices 
of competitors. Nevertheless, we still consider this approach to be more suitable for 
our purposes than identification using industry classification codes. The main reason 
– besides the  above-described shortcomings of industry classification codes – is 
the transparency and replicability of the Commission’s methodology whereby rele-
vant product markets and subsequently relevant competitors are identified. The Com-
mission’s approach to defining relevant markets is clearly set in an official notice 
describing the  main economic principles and procedures the  Commission should 
follow.
17 The final case decisions are publicly available and reveal to what extent 
the Commission followed the recommended methodology. In addition, the Commis-
sion methodology can be subject to judicial review (both by the Court of Justice and 
by the  CFI) and the  Commission’s decisions (including the  market definition) are 
regularly challenged in court.
18 These significant constraints on the Commission’s 
behavior thus limit the scope of the above-described bias in our analysis. 
For horizontal Phase II mergers with available documentation, we further ana-
lyze the Commission’s reports and collect information on companies identified as 
competitors, and we exclude from our sample all cases where main competitors (or 
their parent companies) are not publicly listed.
19 Similarly, we exclude all “2 to 1” 
cases, i.e., situations where the  merging parties are the  only two firms present in 
the relevant market and there is no competitor left after the merger.  
Finally, we end up with 72 Phase II cases suitable for our analysis. In order 
to obtain a relatively representative sample and to avoid sample selection prob-
lems, we follow the approach used in previous studies, we randomly select a sub- 
-sample of Phase I cases, we apply the identical elimination process described above, 
and we end up with a total number of 89 Phase I cases in our sample.
20 For our sam-
ple of 161 merger cases we then collect all the relevant information from the Com-
mission reports: the names and locations of the merging firms, the names of all 
relevant competitors, the product and geographical market definitions, and the final 
decisions.  
17 See Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition 
law (97/C 372/03). In a preliminary analysis, the Commission investigates whether product A and prod-
uct B belong to the same market and looks at the geographic market by analyzing market shares, prices
charged, etc. The Commission then carries out a more detailed analysis based on the concept of demand 
and supply substitutability. In addition, it examines the conditions in which the firms in question operate, 
taking account of recent developments in the market, the results of market studies analyzing consumer 
preferences, regulatory and other barriers to entry, and the views of the merging parties’ customers and 
competitors. 
18 See the comprehensive list of competition-related European courts judgments available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/index.html.  
19 This is again a potential source of bias not discussed in previous studies. Estimating the direction and 
size of this bias is, however, very difficult. One of many possibilities is that by excluding cases with non-
-listed competitors, we are underestimating the foreclosure effects of pro-competitive mergers. Assuming 
that a large share of non-listed competitors are smaller firms with limited access to financing, a pro-com-
petitive merger leading to lower prices that disrupt revenue streams of competitors is more likely to force
a non-listed firm – unable to adapt to the lower prices – to exit the market. This would lead to higher 
market concentration and subsequently lower competition in the market. 
20 We realize that Phase II cases are over-represented in our sample compared to their real occurrence. We
follow the approach of Duso et al. (2007) and do not consider this a significant measurement problem, 
although we realize the potential sample selection bias. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 3                                     261 
3.3 Step 3: Construction of Competitor Gains 
For each merger in our sample we determine the first day the merger announce-
ment appeared in the financial press.
21 For each of the 348 competitors in our sample, 
we collect data on stock prices
22 ( it P ) as well as on the number of shares ( it S ) on 
the announcement date, 260 days before this date as well as 3 days after it to con-
struct the abnormal returns around the announcement date. We also collect “market 
data” for the same period; in particular, we used a country-relevant industry index 
provided by Datastream ( it I ).  
In order to estimate abnormal returns on the  announcement date, we use 
the market model approach (Brealey and Myers, 1995): 
                                          it i i mt it RR α βε = ++  
Note that Duso et al. (2007) apply an  “index model” – a  specific form of 
the market model where α is set equal to zero and β equal to one. However, this 
method is more suitable for the  analysis of IPOs, where no historical data are 
available. We avoid this unnecessary simplification and we estimate parameters α 
and β using historical data. In particular, we employ stock returns over the 200-day 
trading period ending 60 days prior to the announcement date.
23 We exclude the 60- 
-day period in order to minimize the potential “pre-announcement rumors” effect – 
information about a prospective merger usually appears in public before the official 
merger announcement. Including this period could thus bias our estimates.
24 Using 
the standard OLS approach we estimate the model parameters, which we then use to 
predict firm i’s normal return on the announcement date, i.e., we estimate the stock 
price return for the hypothetical event where the merger would not have been an-
nounced ( ˆ
it R ).  
Consequently, we calculate the  abnormal return around the  merger announce-
ment date t ( it AR ). Given the possibility of information leaks, which influence firm 
i’s return before (or after) the merger announcement, and the fact that the market 
might not absorb the announcement information quickly enough, we define the total 
21 The announcement date was obtained from “Dow Jones Factiva” (a customizable business news and re-
search product that integrates content from newspapers, newswires, journals, research reports, and web sites). 
22 Stock market data were obtained from “Thomson Datastream” (the world’s largest statistical and finan-
cial database). All prices were transformed into constant 2000 USD thousands. 
23 Note that there is no clear agreement in the previous literature on the optimal length of the estimation 
period. Eckbo (1983) estimates the parameters of the market model using the 400 days surrounding the an-
nouncement day (day 0) excluding period -50 through 50. Brady and Feinberg (1998) stop the estimation 
period 10 days prior to the first announcement date. Duso, Gugler, and Yortoglu (2005) estimate the mar-
ket model over 240 trading days ending 20 days prior to the announcement day, while Clougherty and 
Duso (2008) use an identical trading period that ends 60 days prior to the announcement date. Aktas et al. 
(2007) use 200 daily observations during a period that ends 30 days before the initial announcement day. 
In line with Duso et al. (2007) we follow a conservative approach estimating the market model over 200 trad-
ing days while excluding a relatively long period of 60 trading days before the merger.  
24 Including the period immediately before the announcement day would result in underestimation of ab-
normal returns, as the estimated parameters of the market model would already capture part of the effect of 
the merger announcement on the competitor’s share price.  262                                           Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 3 
effect as a cumulative abnormal return (CAR): the sum of the daily abnormal returns 
within an  event window of a  particular length. We compute the  CAR for event 
windows of different lengths ( 1 τ  before and  2 τ  after the announcement date), in par-
ticular 1, 2, and 3 days around the announcement date: 
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Based on this data we construct the  main competitors’ gain from merger 
variable, which we use for the assessment of the merger’s competitive effects. The main 
competitors for each merger are firms that the Commission identifies to be present in all 
relevant markets and are thus most likely to be influenced by the merger.
25 First, for each 
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For each merger case J in our sample, we then calculate the “average” compe-
titors’ gain from the merger (
CG
J Π ) as the weighted average of the above-defined in-
dividual competitor gains.
27 The average market capitalization for a given 200-day 
trading period is used as the weight. 
                           
CG

















For each merger case we compare the average competitors’ gains with the Com-
mission’s final decision. We evaluate the Commission’s decision as a “type I dis-
crepancy” in cases where a  merger was prohibited (Article 8.3) while the  market 
considered it pro-competitive ( 0
CG
J Π < ). Given the low number of prohibitions in 
the history of EU merger control, we expanded the definition of a “weak type I dis-
crepancy” to include cases where a merger was prohibited or approved with remedies 
(Article 6.1.b or Article 8.2), while the  market considered the  merger to be pro- 
-competitive. Furthermore, we classify a “type II discrepancy” for cases cleared by 
the  Commission with no objections (Article 6.1.b or Article 8.1) where the  stock 
market reaction was positive ( 0
CG
J Π > ), thus indicating an anti-competitive nature of 
the merger.  
25 The right treatment of relevant competitors when estimating a merger’s competitive effects is in fact 
a complex question. The method suggested by Duso et al. (2007) is to use all competitors available for one
specific merger irrespective of the relevant market in which they are present. Another approach is to use 
each single relevant market as a separate observation and then correct for the correlation among these ob-
servations with a clustering procedure at the merger level. Our approach, where we work only with com-
petitors present in all relevant markets, might be considered a compromise between these two methods. 
26 In those cases where main competitors are absent, we use major rivals from each relevant market and
control for those cases in our further analysis.  
27 Note that in about 60% of cases the stock reaction of individual competitors had the same sign as the ag-
gregate competitors’ gain 
CG
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3.4 Step 4: Econometric Model 
3.4.1 Model Specification 
Our econometric model is based on the theoretical framework of Neven and 
Röller (2005), which specifies that an antitrust agency maximizes its own utility and 
where third parties (firms, governments, etc.) can affect the  agency’s utility. We 
assume a linear relationship between the occurrence of both types of discrepancies 
(type 1 discrepancies – T1, type 2 discrepancies – T2) and various explanatory vari-
ables (X) that are observable and can potentially influence the decision making of 
the agency. 
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Based on previous studies, we identify factors that might affect the occurrence 
of discrepancies and we specify equations (1) and (2) as follows:  
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Table 2 presents the list of variables used for the specification of the model. 
The following section provides a more detailed discussion on the explanatory 
variables used in our model. 
 
Power of Competitors  
The Commission is often criticized for giving excessive attention to the wel-
fare of competing firms.
28 Typically, during the merger evaluation procedure, the Com-
mission takes into account the concerns of competitors and their views on the compet-
itive effects of the proposed merger. This apparent willingness to listen to competitors 
gives rise to concerns about the possible influence of competitors on the final de-
cision of the agency. For this reason, we include a proxy for the competitors’ incentive 
to influence the Commission’s decision, measured as the expected change in the mar-
ket value of the main competitors (
CG Π % ).  
Institutional Factors 
There are a number of institutional and political economic variables that may 
influence the Commission’s decision making. As suggested in previous studies
29, 
the size of the country in which the merging firms originate does play a role in 
 
28 See Neven and Röller (2002) for further details.  
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Table 2 Definition of Variables  
Variable Definition 
Dependant Variables 
T1  Dummy = 1 if a pro-competitive merger was blocked or cleared 
with remedies. 
T2  Dummy = 1 if an anti-competitive merger was cleared without remedies. 
Independent Variables 
Π % CG  
Expected gains from mergers for the competitors. Cumulative change 
in stock market value (relative to an index) for the competitors on the day 
around the first announcement date of the merger. The value is  
expressed in 2000 constant USD (thousands). 
Big_EU  Dummy = 1 if one of the merging part comes from one big EU country 
(France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK). 
Ph_II  Dummy = 1 if the merger decision was made in Phase II proceeding. 
Trend 
Official number of the merger case - captures increasing number 
of evaluated cases more efficiently then the date (year) of the official 
merger announcement. 
National  Dummy = 1 if the relevant geographic market is national. 
Cross_EU 
Dummy = 1 if the acquirer comes from the country outside the EU and 
the merger target comes from the EU. 
Extra_EU  Dummy = 1 if the both merging parties come from the countries outside  
of the EU. 
ECMR_2004  Dummy=1 if the merger was evaluated under the new ECMR. 
Network  Dummy = 1 if the merger concerns telecom, transports, electricity or 
the financial industry. 
Vertical_Eff  Dummy = 1 if the Commission identified vertical or conglomerate effects. 
No_Main_Competitor  Dummy=1 if there is not at least one competitor active at all merger- 
-relevant product markets. 
Same_Country  Dummy = 1 if the both merging parties come from the same country. 
 
the Commission’s decision – large countries might, for instance, exercise significant 
political pressure to have an anti-competitive transaction cleared if it benefits their 
national champions, thus increasing the occurrence of type II discrepancies. We there-
fore control for cases where the merging parties are from large EU member states (vari-
able Big_EU).  
Procedural Issues 
Regarding procedural issues, some critics have pointed out the inadequacy of 
Phase I proceedings, as the Commission might not have enough time and resources 
to evaluate complex merger cases properly.
30 Therefore, we test whether the  oc-
currence of type II discrepancies is positively correlated with Phase I proceedings 
(variable PH_II).
31  
30 See Neven and Röller (2002) for further details. 
31 Strong type I discrepancies, i.e., pro-competitive mergers blocked by the Commission, are in this case ir-
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Another question that arises with respect to the Commission’s expert teams is 
their increasing workload. While the average number of transactions evaluated dur-
ing the period of 1990–1999 was only 124 cases per year, the expert teams’ workload 
almost tripled in the last decade, reaching 321 cases per annum between 2000 and 
2008. We thus control for the effect of increasing workload in our model (variable 
Trend). 
Another issue of concern is the market definition applied in the Commission’s 
analyses. Neven et al. (1993) claim that EU merger guidelines are biased toward ex-
cessively narrow market definitions, both in terms of the wording of the guidelines 
and in actual practice. As a result, a narrow market definition may be associated with 
a higher frequency of type I discrepancies, i.e., too narrowly defined markets might 
result in exaggeration of the anti-competitive effects of the merger in particular sub-
markets, neglecting the overall competitive dynamics of the market concerned. We 
use all cases where the Commission identified the relevant geographical market as 
national in scope as a proxy for narrow market definition (variable National).  
Preference for Domestic Firms 
Disagreements between the EU and US regulators in cases that fall under both 
legislations (in particular in the GE/Honeywell and Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merg-
ers and in the Microsoft antitrust case) uncover another important issue –potential 
protectionism of domestic firms in the EU. The financial press has often raised 
the suspicion that the EU focuses more on the protection of domestic competitors 
rather than consumers.
32 Aktas et al. (2007) find that the more harm suffered by Euro-
pean rival firms when the  acquirer is from outside the  European Community, 
the greater the likelihood of European regulatory intervention against the proposed 
combination. Such evidence does not support an unambiguous conclusion of protec-
tionism, but it certainly raises some doubts. We therefore distinguish the  type of 
the mergers in our sample – intra-European, extra-European, and cross-euro-border 
mergers – to control for this potential effect (variables Cross_EU and Extra_EU). 
Effect of the 2004 Reform 
We include a variable that should at least partially capture the recent legis-
lative changes in the EU merger regulation (variable ECMR_2004).
33 The promised 
consumer-oriented approach in the evaluation process, clear specification of counter-
vailing factors, and prolonged investigation periods might have had a positive effect 
on the Commission’s accuracy. We thus expect lower occurrence of both type I and 
type II discrepancies since the introduction of the new legislation. 
In light of the above discussion, the right side of both equations consists of 
other factors that could affect the occurrence of both types of discrepancies. The vec-
tor X contains other important controlling variables, such as specific treatment of 
mergers in network industries (variable Network) and the presence of vertical effects 
(variable Vertical_Eff) – see above.  
32 See for instance the Financial Times articles by J. Johnson, “A poor prescription for French national
champions” from 27 March 2004 and by A. Michaels, “Ambassador for US blasts Rome on Protection-
ism” from 20 April 2007. 
33 The limited size of our sample allows us to test only the “base” effect of the regulatory reform, i.e., 
looking for the  significant changes in the  model intercept for the  subsample of cases evaluated under 
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3.4.2 Model Estimation 
PROBIT Regression 
Following the  methodology applied in previous studies, we use PROBIT 
regression to estimate equations (3) and (4). The PROBIT model can be derived 
from the assumption that there exists a latent unobservable variable P
* – in our case 
the  Commission’s view on the  anti-competitive effects of the  merger. If the  latent 
variable takes a value above some critical level, then the merger is prohibited (P = 0), 
other-wise it is approved (P = 1). Thus, for each subsample (pro-competitive and anti- 
-competitive mergers) we estimate the parameters of the model assuming that the la-
tent variable is generated by the model: 
                                                        
* PX β ε ′ = +  
where β is a vector of parameters (weights), X is a vector of explanatory variables, 
and  ~( 0 , 1 ) N ε  is a random shock. It is then easy to show that: 
                                                   (1 ) () PrP X Φ β′ = =  
This gives us the likelihood for both cases, P = 0 and P = 1. Assuming the ob-
servations are i.i.d., it is easy to construct the sample log-likelihood. This can be 
maximized using standard nonlinear maximization algorithms. 
However, we should note that the announcement of a merger states the in-
tention of the merging parties and it is usually subject to review by antitrust agencies. 
Therefore, the stock market reaction to the particular event reflects not only the es-
timate of the change in the future performance of the merging parties, but also 
the likelihood that the deal will be cleared. The change in the value of the stock at 
the time of the announcement is equal to the probability of clearance times the value 
that will be generated by the transaction. Therefore, the anticipated profits cannot be 
exogenous, as the  market takes into account the  antitrust procedure (Aktas et al., 
2007).
34 In order to overcome the endogeneity of the observed competitors’ gains, we 
use the approach of Duso et al. (2007). First, we estimate the PROBIT model, regressing 
the  probability of merger clearance on the  subset of relevant exogenous variables. 
Then, for each merger case in our sample we divide the observable competitors’ gains 
by the predicted probability of the merger being cleared, i.e., we are able to reconstruct 
the real effects of the merger on competitors’ profits and use them in estimating equa-
tions (3) and (4).
35  
34 Note, however, that we only need the sign of the  expected stock price change in order to evaluate 
the competitive nature of the merger used for identification of type I and type II discrepancies, as the prob-
ability of the merger being cleared is always non-negative.  
35 Let Π
CG be the abnormal change in the value of competitors’ stocks on the day of announcement of 
the merger. Let the p be the probability that the market assigns to the event that the merger is cleared. Then 
Π
CG = p Π % CG  can be interpreted as the expected change in competitors’ value conditional on the event that 
the merger is cleared by the antitrust authority. Since p must be non-negative,  Π % CG and Π
CG have the same 
sign, enabling us to identify anti-competitive (pro-competitive) cases using only the observed reaction of 
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Marginal Effects 
The equation coefficients estimated by the PROBIT regression do not illus-
trate the partial effects of a  change in a  particular explanatory variable on the  de-
pendent variable, as is the case for linear regression models. A default method to 
overcome this difficulty, offered by most statistical packages, is to calculate the mar-
ginal effects (partial derivatives) at the values of the independent variables fixed at 
their sample means. This is the standard method used for the calculation of marginal 
effects in previous studies (Duso et al., 2007).  
Note, however, that this approach has two main limitations. Firstly, the for-
mula is not very intuitive in the presence of dummy variables: the sample means used 
in the calculation of marginal effects refer to nonexistent observations, as the dummy 
variable never takes the value of its sample mean. Secondly, this method might gen-
erate estimation bias in the presence of observations where one continuous variable 
takes extremely high (low) values.
36  
To remove these limitations, we follow the method suggested by Bartus (2005), 
which is becoming increasingly popular among researchers in social sciences work-
ing with large sets of dichotomous control variables.
37  
We define average marginal effects (AME) as the average amount of the change 
in the expected value of a dependent variable: 
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where 
k x β denotes the value of the linear combination of the parameters and vari-
ables for the k
th observation. 
In order to estimate the marginal effects for dummy variables we use the fol-
lowing formula: 
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Using the formulas above, we calculate the average marginal effects across the full 
sample, thus avoiding the problem of setting dummy variables at their means, as well 
as the potential negative effect of extreme values of continuous variables. Note that we 
use “marginal effects” in the following sections only for explanatory purposes while 
in fact we always refer to the AME. 
36 This is exactly the case of our sample. Π
CG takes extremely high values for observations where large cor-
porations are indentified as competitors (such as AT&T with its market capitalization of almost USD 30 bil-
lion). Those observations push the sample mean of Π
CG well above its median value, and most of the ob-
servations in the sample have Π
CG below the mean. By computing the marginal effects at the fixed means 
we underestimate the effect of dummy variables, making the variable Π
CG the perfect predictor. Instead of 
excluding observations with extremely high Π
CG, we apply the method suggested by Bartus (2005), which 
overcomes this problem. 
37 See, for instance, Hyytinen and Ilmakunnas (2007) and Jens et al. (2008). Note that Bartus (2005) only 
focuses on AME calculation in STATA. For a more conceptual discussion, see Chamberlain (1984, p. 1,274). 268                                           Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 3 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Results 
Our sample includes selected EU merger cases completed by the Commission 
in the period 1990–2008. We work with 72 Phase II cases, 89 Phase I cases, and a total 
number of 348 competitors with complete information. As described in the previous 
section, we computed the abnormal returns of competitors around the announcement 
day. The cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) of the competitors in our 
sample are -0.13%, -0.24%, and -0.33% for the 3-, 5-, and 7-day event windows, all 
being statistically significant at the 5% significance level. The negative competitors’ 
CAARs would suggest that EU mergers are evaluated by the market as pro-com-
petitive on average, which is in line with Aktas et al. (2007), who find the compe-
titors’ CAAR to be negative at -0.24% during an 11-day event window. On the other 
hand, Clougherty and Duso (2008) find a positive competitors’ CAAR of 0.37% over 
the 3-day event window. In general, there is mixed evidence on the effects of merg-
ers on rivals – see Aktas et al. (2007, p. 1106) for a recent overview.  
For each merger case, we calculated the average competitors’ gain (Π
CG)
 as 
the weighted average of changes in the market value of main competitors, and we 
identified the  discrepancies between the  Commission’s evaluation and the  market 
evaluation of the  merger. As can be seen from Table 3, the  distribution of dis-
crepancies does not vary significantly and we therefore focus only on results from 
the 5-day window in our further analysis.  
Table 4 reports the number of cases in our sample according to the decisions 
taken by the Commission and according to the stock market evaluation of the merg-
er’s competitive effects. Unconditional clearances are associated with Article 6.1.b 
decisions in Phase I, as long as they do not involve conditions, and with Article 8.1 
decisions in Phase II. Similarly, prohibitions are associated with Article 8.3 decisions 
(only in Phase II). Cases cleared with remedies imposed on the merging parties are 
associated with Article 6.1b – decisions with conditions (Phase I) or with Article 8.2 
decisions (Phase II). We observe that 52% of all cases are classified as pro-competi-
tive. Given that a merger is pro-competitive, only 4 out of 84 cases (4.76%) are 
blocked and involve strong type I discrepancies. Weak type I discrepancies are ob-
served in 19 out of 84 cases, or some 22.6%. Given that a merger is anti-competitive, 
43 out of 77 cases (55.8%) involve type II discrepancies. 
Note also that our data identify as strong type I discrepancies in two out of 
three cases that were later overturned on appeal by the CFI – namely, the Airtours/ 
/First Choice and Tetra Laval/Sidel cases. The other controversial case – Schneider/ 
/Legrand – was not identified as an error.
38  
Regarding conditioning error occurrence on the  particular Commission de-
cision, our data find that the number of strong type I discrepancies in relation to 
the total number of prohibitions is 4 out of 8 (50%). Excluding those cases where 
the Commission raised serious concerns about possible foreclosure of competitors, 
we get 3 out of 8 (37.5%).
39 With respect to weak type I discrepancies, the total 
 
38 A fourth appealed case, General Electric/Honeywell, was not included in our analysis due to the fact that 
the merger resulted in the creation of a monopoly in the market for large commercial jet engines – a so-
-called 2-to-1 case. For more details on the selection criteria see section 6.1.1. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 3                                     269 
Table 3  Frequency of Discrepancies by the Different Window Lengths (in %) 
   Frequency of discrepancies 
Window length  Type I  Weak Type I Type II 
3 days window  5,81  22,05  56,33 
5 days window  4,76  22.62  55,84 
7 days window  3,70  20,80  58,25 
 
Table 4  Decisions and Competitors’ Gains 
   Phase I  Phase II   







Art 8.2.  
(Cleared with 
Remedies) 
Art 8.3.  
(Prohibited)   
Negative Gains 
(pro-competitive)  43 3 18  16 4    84 
Positive Gains 
(anti-competitive)  33 4 10  26 4    77 
   Total  76  7  28  42  8  161 
 
number is 23 out of 57 (40.4%), or 17 out of 57 (29.8%) when controlling for fore-
closure effects. Regarding type II discrepancies as a percentage of all mergers that 
were cleared, our data suggest that the share is around 41.3% of the cases in our 
sample.
40  
The estimation of equations (3) and (4) proceeds by splitting our dataset into 
anti- and pro-competitive subsamples. In particular, we estimate (3) on the sample of 
pro-competitive deals ( 0
CG
J Π < ). We use the weak definition of type I discrepancies 
for construction of our dependent variable – we set T1 = 1 when a pro-competitive 
merger was blocked or cleared with remedies. Equation (4) is estimated on the sam-
ple of all anti-competitive deals ( 0
CG
J Π > ) and we set T2 = 1 if an anti-competitive 
merger was cleared without conditions.
41 The summary statistics are provided in Table 5 
in the Appendix.  
4.2 Weak Type I Discrepancies 
The results are presented in Tables 6 and 7 in the Appendix. Our results sug-
gest that the occurrence of discrepancies between the Commission and market eval-
uations cannot be explained by the random process, i.e., there are other factors that 
determine the occurrence of these discrepancies. 
39 In cases where a serious threat of foreclosure of competitors is identified, negative competitors’ gains
might reflect the possible exit of the competitor from the market rather than an expected increase of com-
petitiveness in the market. 
40 Compared with the findings of Duso et al. (2007), our results also identified about half of all cases as
pro-competitive, but the frequency of errors conditional on merger competitiveness diverge: 4.75% of 
type I discrepancies, 56% of weak type I discrepancies, and 42% of type II discrepancies. Our dataset thus
shows a higher occurrence of type II discrepancies and a lower frequency of weak type I discrepancies. 
Duso et al. (2007) find similar probabilities of the occurrence of both types of discrepancies, but in their
case discrepancies occur in roughly one in four mergers that are cleared (or blocked).  
41 The estimations were carried out using STATA 9.2 software. We controlled for collinearity and poten-
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Regarding the power of competitors, our results suggest that competitors have 
no influence over the Commission’s decisions as far as pro-competitive mergers are 
concerned. With respect to preferential conditions for large EU countries, we find vari-
able Big_EU to be significant at the 5% level. According to the estimates of marginal 
effects in Table 7, the large EU countries have about a 20% lower chance of getting 
a pro-competitive deal curtailed by the Commission.  
Considering procedural issues, we see that variable Phase_II is significant at 
the 1% significance level and has a positive sign, implying that weak type I discrep-
ancies are more likely in Phase II. The probability of a pro-competitive deal being 
curtailed is about 50% higher in Phase II. On the other hand, the steadily increasing 
number of cases (Trend) appraised by the Commission does not have any significant 
effect on the occurrence of weak type I discrepancies.  
The effect of the variable National is not statistically significant. Thus, nar-
rowly defined markets do not lead to an unnecessary burden being imposed on pro- 
-competitive deals.
42  
Our estimates suggest that there is no evidence of protectionist behavior by 
the EU antitrust agency. While variable Extra_EU is statistically insignificant, the ef-
fect of Cross_EU is significant at the 5% level. Moreover, the probability of unnec-
essary remedies (or a prohibition) is about 23% lower when the acquirer comes from 
outside the EU. One possible explanation is that these large multinational mergers 
usually fall under the scope of several antitrust agencies. Therefore, the existence of 
multiple independent assessments might generate a disciplinary effect on the EU 
regulator.  
With respect to the effects of the EU regulatory reform, we see that variable 
ECMR_2004 is not significant at the 10% level. It should be noted, however, that 
the variable is not completely insignificant (the p-value being around 0.13) and that 
the marginal effect estimate suggests positive effects of the reform – weak type I 
discrepancies are 20% less likely for cases evaluated under the new ECMR.  
Concerning the  other controlling variables, we do not find any significant 
effect of network industries (Network), nor does the existence of vertical effects show 
any significant impact (Vertical_Effects). Cases where the merging parties come from 
the same country do not have any significant effect on the frequency of weak type I 
discrepancies either (Same_Country). The only significant controlling variable is 
No_Main_Competitor – the probability of weak type I discrepancies is about 17% 
higher for cases where several product markets were identified but none of the rele-
vant competitors was present in all of the markets.
43  
We also control for the potential bias associated with the presence of fore-
closure effects. As already mentioned, negative competitor gains might be induced 
by expected foreclosure of competitors rather than by increased competition in the rel-
evant markets – these mergers would thus be wrongly classified as pro-competitive. 
42 Note again that we assumed that imposed remedies increase consumer welfare. Therefore, from the de-
finition of weak type I discrepancies, imposing conditions and obligations on particular product markets
only increases the overall positive effect of mergers evaluated as pro-competitive by the stock market. 
43 The interpretation of this result is rather ambiguous. One possible explanation is to connect those errors
with a too narrow product market definition. However, there is also a potential measurement error re-
sulting from the inability to capture the overall competitive effect of a merger.  Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 3                                     271 
Therefore, we exclude cases where the Commission raised concerns about the fore-
closure effects of the merger and we re-estimate equation (3) on this restricted sam-
ple. As we can see from Table 4, the parameter estimates do not change considerably. 
We observe a significant change in two parameters only.  
First, the variable National becomes significant at the 10% level. If the Com-
mission identifies at least one of the markets concerned as national, the probability of 
a weak type I discrepancy increases by approximately 13%. Second, the vertical ef-
fects of the proposed transaction seem to play a significant role now. The probability 
that unnecessary remedies will be imposed on a deal considered pro-competitive by 
the market decreases by 17% in the presence of vertical effects. The interpretation of 
this result is again ambiguous. One possible explanation is that our restricted sample 
does not cover any mergers where vertical (conglomerate) effects could potentially 
lead to the foreclosure of competitors. Vertical mergers that do not lead to the mar-
ginalization of competitors are usually considered beneficial for consumers, mainly 
due to elimination of double marginalization (Tirole, 1988). The incentive for the Com-
mission to impose remedies might therefore be lower for merger cases where positive 
vertical effects are observed.  
4.3 Type II Discrepancies 
Turning to the analysis of type II discrepancies, our results again suggest that 
they cannot be considered random.  
Regarding the influence of competitors, we find variable 
CG Π %  to be signifi-
cant at the 1% significance level. Interestingly, the coefficient has a negative sign, 
implying that the more positive the expected increase in competitors’ value, the less 
probable it is that an anti-competitive merger will be cleared. This is slightly counter-
intuitive, as one would expect the effort of competitors to influence the agency to 
increase with the  size of the  anticipated gains from the  merger, thus resulting in 
a positive relationship between 
CG Π %  and type II discrepancies. One possible expla-
nation is that the  Commission takes into account the  stock market reaction to 
the merger announcement when evaluating the proposed transaction. An overly opti-
mistic reaction of competitors’ stocks might potentially trigger a more careful assess-
ment of the merger by the regulator. Note, however, that the magnitude of this effect 
appears relatively marginal. For illustration, an increase in equity of about USD 240 mil-
lion around the announcement date – which equals the median gain in our anti-com-
petitive sample – would result in an approximately 5% lower probability of a type II 
discrepancy. We thus consider the influence of competitors to be of minor impor-
tance.  
The variable Big_EU is not significant and our results suggest that large EU 
countries cannot use their political power to get the Commission to clear anti-com-
petitive deals. 
Regarding procedural issues, the variable Phase_II is again highly significant 
and large in magnitude. The marginal effect implicitly shows that the probability of 
approving an anti-competitive merger is some 48% larger in Phase I. This observa-
tion is further supported by the significance of the Trend variable representing the in-
creased workload coupled with the higher proportion of cases decided in Phase I 
proceedings. According to our results, the probability that an anti-competitive merger 
will be cleared has increased slightly (on average by 2% p.a.) in the last decade.
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A narrow market definition (National) significantly increases the chances that 
the anti-competitive effects of a proposed merger will be recognized by the Commis-
sion. If the Commission identifies at least one of the markets concerned as national, 
the probability of an anti-competitive merger being cleared decreases by 13%. Note that, 
according to our data, the positive effect of the national market definition (a lower 
frequency of type II discrepancies) is of comparable magnitude to the negative effect 
arising from an unduly narrow geographic market definition (higher occurrence of 
weak type I discrepancies in our subsample corrected for foreclosure effects). How-
ever, given the significantly higher number of mergers cleared by the Commission 
and the negative effects of anti-competitive mergers on consumers, a higher frequen-
cy of weak type I discrepancies might be seen as a  reasonable price to pay for 
the higher probability of identifying anti-competitive deals.  
As in the case of weak type I discrepancies, our estimates suggest that there is 
no clear evidence of protectionist behavior by the  EU antitrust authority. While 
the variable  Extra_EU is statistically insignificant, the  effect of Cross_EU is sig-
nificant at the 5% level. The negative marginal effect implies that anti-competitive 
mergers involving EU firms (both target and acquirer) have about a 21% higher prob-
ability of being cleared. Again, this might be explained by more careful examination 
of cross-euro-border cases rather than by systematic discrimination against foreign 
acquirers by the Commission. 
The variable ECMR_2004 is significant at the 10% significance level. Our re-
sults suggest a positive effect of the 2004 reform; type II discrepancies are about 22% 
less likely under the new EU merger control system. It therefore appears that the prom-
ised “economic approach” and the procedural improvements of the new ECMR have 
helped the Commission to better align its merger evaluations with market expec-
tations, at least with respect to combinations assessed as anti-competitive by the mar-
ket. 
Considering the control variables, none of them proved significant.
45  
5. Conclusion 
We collected a unique representative sample of 161 merger cases evaluated by 
the Commission in the period 1990 to 2008 and we empirically analyzed the effi-
ciency of EU merger control. We collected information on 348 relevant competitors 
and used stock market data to identify mergers that the market anticipated as anti- 
-competitive. From this, we identified instances where the Commission had prohibited 
mergers that the stock market regarded as pro-competitive as well as instances where 
the Commission had failed to prevent anti-competitive mergers. Using the PROBIT 
model, we further investigated the sources of these discrepancies with a particular 
focus on the effects of the 2004 regulatory reform on the occurrence of these dis-
crepancies. 
44 The average number of cases evaluated yearly is about 314 in the period 1998–2008. Using a rough 
estimate of the “average” marginal effect, we can simply multiply the average number of cases by the es-
timated marginal effect to get the change in the probability of a type II discrepancy. 
45 Note that we controlled for potential misspecification of our model by excluding the insignificant con-
trol variables and repeating the PROBIT regression. Nevertheless, neither the sign of the coefficients nor 
the  significance of the  other variables changed. Therefore, we present the  results including the  insig-
nificant control variables as well.  Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 3                                     273 
In line with previous studies, our results suggest that the discrepancies be-
tween the Commission and the market are mainly driven by procedural and institu-
tional factors. We also reject the  claim that the  Commission listens too much to 
competitors at the expense of consumers.  
Our evidence further suggests that mergers involving firms from large EU 
countries have a significantly lower probability of bearing unnecessary remedies im-
posed by the Commission. However, we did not find any evidence that the Commis-
sion is willing to clear anti-competitive deals involving firms from large Member 
States. We do not find any evidence supporting the alleged protectionist behavior by 
the Commission, either. Our results suggest only that mergers involving a foreign 
acquirer are examined under closer scrutiny.  
Procedural issues still play a significant role. The probability that an anti-com-
petitive merger will be cleared is significantly higher if the final decision is made in 
a Phase I proceeding. This is accompanied by a significant effect of the increasing 
workload of expert teams on the occurrence of this type of discrepancy. On the other 
hand, Phase II proceedings often result in the imposition of unnecessary remedies on 
mergers evaluated as pro-competitive by the market. Nevertheless, given the signifi-
cantly larger proportion of transactions decided in Phase I, the unnecessary remedies 
can be considered a reasonable price to pay for a higher probability of identifying 
anti-competitive mergers. Our data suggest a positive effect deriving from the 2004 
reform, at least with respect to mergers evaluated as anti-competitive by the market. 
We found that for mergers appraised under the new regulation, the probability of 
an anti-competitive deal being cleared decreases significantly. We did not find any 
significant effect of the 2004 reform on the occurrence of weak type I discrepancies: 
the occurrence of unnecessary remedies has not decreased as a result of the new 
merger control system.  
We recognize a need for further research in this area, and more data could 
confirm the robustness of our results and fully capture the real effects of the recent 
regulatory reform of the  EU merger control system. A  larger data sample would 
allow for more advanced econometric analysis, enabling us to test the effects of the 2004 
reform in more detail. We could, for instance, look at the systemic effects of the re-
form by testing whether there is any significant change in the slopes of relevant ex-
planatory variables, i.e., something that the limited size of our current sample did not 
allow for. Another potential approach would be to look at the real ex-post effects of 
mergers on competition and prices in the  relevant markets, instead of relying on 
the  ex-ante evaluation provided by the  stock market. Although this approach has 
a number of shortcomings, it would allow us to move away from the controversial 
efficient market hypothesis, on which our current approach depends heavily.274                                           Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 3 
APPENDIX: Results and Statistics 
 
Table 5  Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
W_Type_I (T1)  84 0.4167  0.4960  0  1 
Type_II (T2)  77 0.6753  0.4713  0  1 
Π % CG   161 63302  1704696  -  8105858  11500000 
Big_EU  161 0.7019  0.4589  0  1 
Trend  161 2275  1489 12 5123 
National  161 0.3665  0.4833  0  1 
Extra_EU  161 0.1180  0.3236  0  1 
Cross_EU  161 0.1863  0.3906  0  1 
ECMR_2004  161 0.2857  0.4532  0  1 
Network  161 0.1429  0.3510  0  1 
Vertical_Eff  161 0.3230  0.4691  0  1 
No_Main_Comp  161 0.2360  0.4260  0  1 
Same_Country  161 0.2609  0.4405  0  1 
 
Table 6  Probit Results 
WType I 
discrepancies 
WType I  
discrepancies 
Foreclosure Correction 
Type II  
discrepancies 
Dependent variable  
Coef.  p-Values Coef.  p-Values Coef.  p-Values 
Π % CG   -1.74E-07 0.2310 -2.59E-07  0.2550 -1.63E-06 0.0000 
Big_EU  -0.9480 0.0470  -1.0807  0.0350  -0.8586 0.1280 
Phase_II  2.0985 0.0000 2.0629  0.0000  -2.7779 0.0000 
Trend  0.0002 0.3120 0.0001  0.7560  0.0005 0.0880 
National  0.5671 0.1240 0.6832  0.0970  -1.1176 0.0530 
Cross_EU  -1.1965 0.0340  -1.1272  0.0500  -1.6912 0.0120 
Extra_EU  -0.2228 0.7710  -0.1091  0.8900  0.3541 0.6850 
ECMR_2004  -1.0484 0.1370  -0.4232  0.5690  -1.7101 0.0930 
Network  0.1995 0.7350 0.3486  0.5690  0.1978 0.7280 
Same_Country  -0.1772 0.6760  -0.4050  0.3680  -0.7581 0.1590 
Vertical_Eff  -0.7326 0.1240  -0.9050  0.0650  0.5698 0.2800 
No_Main_Comp  0.8185 0.0160 0.8707  0.0100  0.0047 0.9940 
_cons  -0.9263 0.1090  -0.7546  0.1910  3.6229 0.0000 
Observations  84 78 77 
Log Likelihood  -30.738206 -28.687419 -16.832526 
Chi-Squared  53.26 44.85 34.12 
Significance level  0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 
Pseudo R2  0.4612 0.4527 0.6532 
Correct Predictions  0.8095 0.7949 0.8961 Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 61, 2011, no. 3                                     275 
Notes: The estimation of Weak Type I discrepancies is on the sub-sample of pro-competitive mergers, while 
the estimation of Type II discrepancies is on the sub-sample of anti-competitive mergers. The depen-
dent variables are weak type1 (T1) and type2 (T2) discrepancies . The Π % CG  variable is corrected for p, 
the predicted probability of the case being cleared obtained from a probit estimation on the full sample, 
where dependent variable is Clear and the exogenous variables are a constant, Big_EU, Phase_II, 
Trend, National, Cross_EU, Extra_EU, ECMR_2004, Network, Same_Country and Vertical_Eff. 
 
Table 7  Marginal Effects 
WType I  
discrepancies 
WType I  
discrepancies 
Type II  
discrepancies  Dependent  
variable 
 Foreclosure  Correction  
   Coef.  p-Values Coef. p-Values Coef. p-Values 
Π % CG   -3.48E-08 0.2280 -5.22E-08 0.2440 -1.95E-07 0.0000 
Big_EU  -0.1976 0.0240  -0.2262 0.0120  -0.0981 0.1580 
Phase_II  0.4977 0.0000 0.4747 0.0000  -0.4705 0.0000 
Trend  0.0000 0.3000 0.0000 0.7550 0.0001 0.0600 
National  0.1107 0.1470 0.1299 0.1320  -0.1354 0.0630 
Cross_EU  -0.2250 0.0050  -0.2104 0.0070  -0.2100 0.0090 
Extra_EU  -0.0437 0.7650  -0.0217 0.8880 0.0411 0.6740 
ECMR_2004  -0.2054 0.0850  -0.0845 0.5430  -0.2092 0.1090 
Network  0.0407 0.7380 0.0730 0.5820 0.0233 0.7260 
Same_Country  -0.0349 0.6710  -0.0784 0.3400  -0.0974 0.1820 
Vertical_Eff  -0.1420 0.1030  -0.1720 0.0360 0.0736 0.2220 
No_Main_Comp  0.1694 0.0270 0.1821 0.0200 0.0006 0.9940 
 
Notes: Coefficients represent average effects of partial derivative of E[y] = F[βX]. For the binominal (dummy) 
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